My project is to assess recent objections directed at Jiirgen Habermas by Nancy Fraser, Iris Young and Seyla Benhabib. This dispute is significant because it concerns the value of the Enlightenment style, detached criticism promoted by Habermas as compared to new proposals about dissent from a stance connected to social movements. I argue that these feminist criticisms of Habermas's critical theory are compelling and that they require substantial changes in Habermas's thinking.
organization of movements) on the state is possible because of the spread of education and means of communication; and (4) periodic elections allow for formal control of the state by the public (Habermas 1974, p. 49) . There are historical examples of this public sphere, such as the liberal model (ibid., pp. 52-53), as well as the principle or regulative ideal of a public sphere as the "rationalization of power through the medium of public discussion among private individuals" (ibid., p. 55).
Habermas's "discourse ethics" is designed as an alternative to Rawls's original position that is not oriented to hypothetical conversation or to the deliberations of one individual (Habermas 1990, pp. 122, 198) . Habermas's central thesis is that "the common core of all kinds of morality can be traced back to the reciprocal imputations and shared presuppositions actors make when they seek understanding in everyday situations" (ibid., p. 201). The main advantage that Habermas claims for his reconstructive science is that he holds fast to the operative assumptions made by any actual participant, while Rawls resorts unnecessarily to the philosophical fiction of an original position with its impracticable veil of ignorance (ibid., p. 198) .
Habermas attempts to refute ethical scepticism once and for all by arguing for the legitimacy of universal moral values. In criticism, norms are valid when they "meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse" (ibid., p. 93). Appeal to a principle of universalization enforces the intuition that "valid norms must deserve recognition by all concerned" (ibid., p. 65). He claims that "True impartiality pertains only to that standpoint from which one can generalize precisely those norms that can count on universal assent because they perceptibly embody an interest common to all affected" (ibid., p. 65).
Why does Habermas value universality so much? The main reason is that he understands universal standards as the only escape from a situation of endlessly competing selfish interests or an "unstable equilibrium of interests supported by temporary power constellations " (1989a, p. 234) . His belief is that universalism prevents moral life from becoming anarchic (1989b, pp. 258-59) .
Second, Habermas maintains that universalist criticism is effective against neoconservative attempts to "minimize the burdens of moral justification on the political system" because it "recognizes no limits" on what can or cannot be criticized (ibid., pp. 41-42) . Third, it shields us from the excesses of nationalism because it limits self-assertion through the recognition of basic human rights everywhere (ibid., p. 256) .
What is the best description of Habermas's political stance? Like Kant, he is a Utopian internationalist who supports the idea of a universal cosmopolitan state. He argues for the maximization of democratic Feminist Criticisms of Habermas 261 decision-making processes, but contends that the human-controlled "life-world" must be properly integrated with unpatterned "systems" of interaction that belong to societies at our complex stage of development. Thus, he dissents from the Marxist model of social planning by arguing that the levels of system differentiation reached in capitalism have "enormous evolutionary advantages" and that these economic advantages are "not something we can control" (1986, p. 91) . However, Habermas tells Nancy Fraser that he understands himself as "the last Marxist" (1992b, p. 469) . He thinks of his work as the completion of the Marxist critique of liberal capitalism, or the ultimate development of the ideas of social improvement set in motion by Marx's egalitarian program of specieswide emancipation.
Habermas's ambivalent relationship with feminism is best summed up in the following three arguments. The first argument concerns legitimate versus illegitimate appeals to interests. In political argument, we can appeal to individual, group or generalizable interests. If we are oriented towards reaching understanding, then (by definition) selfishness and coercion of others are prohibited. The appeal to individual interests is not acceptable in principle because it does not offer a rational solution to a situation involving antagonistic interests (1989a, p. 234) . The appeal to group interests is not acceptable because it does not shield us from continuing conflicts such as nationalism, or group assertion at the expense of other groups (1989b, pp. 254-55) . Therefore the appeal to generalizable interests is the only sound strategy for political argument.
The second argument concerns the appropriate conditions for communities of principle and democracy. In order to be consistent and competent arguers, agents must meet certain minimal, necessary conditions and approximate a set of ideal, sufficient conditions. The minimal conditions are that agents must not be physically violent and they must be oriented only to the force of more or less good reasons (1992b, p. 467) . Agents should approximate a set of ideal conditions that are expressed in rules such as: (1) everyone is allowed to participate without exception; (2) everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatsoever; (3) everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs; and (4) no one may be prevented from exercising these rights by any coercion (1990, p. 89) . These minimal and ideal conditions are actually regulative ideals that guide agents who are committed to reaching understanding. The preferred interpretation of generalizable interests is decided by following these procedures of rationality in a virtually unrestricted communication community (1990, p. 88) .
Either agents should strive to meet these conditions and should be engaged in principled and democratic political relationships with each other or they should not. It is unacceptable when agents propose a model for the moral standpoint that involves contradictory requirements and do not aim for a truly rational public sphere. Therefore agents should strive to meet the conditions and maintain the relationships.
The third argument has two parts, (a) Feminism has led the drive to question the relation between public and private life. It has led the transformation of basic values in everyday life (1970, p. 42; 1989b, p. 191) . Any movement that leads to significant and enduring social improvements is valuable. Hence feminism is a valuable social movement.
(b) Feminism insists that arguers recognize the central category of gender. It proposes a model of argument that involves a retreat in the search for identity into one's own inherent concreteness (1984, p. 27 ). Thus, feminism provides a context in which at least the temptation exists for purely concrete ways of resolving problems of identity and emancipation (1984, pp. 27-28) . Also, feminism puts women first and involves an appeal to the group interests of women as a whole. But the appeal to generalizable interests is the only sound strategy for political argument. And putting women first does not aim for principled and democratic relations between women and men. Feminism helps women to find themselves and deal with moral conflicts in a way that is impoverished because it is not generalizable to all individuals (1984, p. 27) . Therefore, feminism is a dangerous social movement.
Three Feminist Criticisms
It is important that the following three criticisms are feminist rather than merely criticisms that happen to be produced by women. They express a stance that is connected to the feminist movement, and their arguments are effective because of the theoretical background that has been established in our public sphere by that movement. They represent a distinct critical voice, and I argue that refusing to recognize this difference and independence of women's criticism is precisely the problem with Habermas. This distinctiveness is political rather than metaphysical.
This means that it has to do with relations with a political movement rather than with something deep, hidden or mysterious. It does not imply that men cannot occupy the feminist standpoints that women have created for themselves in social arguments by reporting and interpreting women's claims. It does not mean that all women share one worldview but only that women can legitimately construct a range of standpoints that express their interests as women. It does mean that there are differences between the way that men and women as classes are related to the feminist movement.
Moreover, as Young argues, not all feminists appeal to distinctive new values in their critique. "Humanist" feminists (such as Simone de Beauvoir) accept prevailing standards such as mastering nature and individual achievement rather than developing a distinctive revaluation of all values "from which to criticize any institution or practice in our society, even if it does not distinguish women's specific oppression" (1990b, pp. 76-77,86-87) . Young labels this "gynocentric" feminism and mentions a movement such as eco-feminism as an example. If Habermas's thought is merely compatible with humanist feminism, and it can be shown that a more separatist feminism is preferable (strategically) in our current circumstances, then it does not follow that separatist feminism is included in his discourse ethics insofar as its separatism is legitimate. For separatist feminism is not derived from humanist feminism, but attempts a radical break from the demand for homogeneity among citizens. Habermas unwittingly projects characteristically male experiences in his emphasis on the role of speaking out as a private individual in a public sphere, and this only begs the question against the development of feminist counter-publics.
The first criticism is that Habermas's primary theoretical distinctions are inadequate from a feminist perspective. For example, Fraser makes a case against his contrast between system integration and social (or lifeworld) integration. Her main point is that "the characterization of the family as a socially integrated, symbolic reproduction domain and the characterization of the paid workplace, on the other hand, as a systemintegrated material reproduction domain tends to exaggerate the differences and occlude the similarities between them" (Fraser 1989, p. 119 ). Yet emancipation requires an accurate assessment of the causes and consequences that distort the lives of women, and inadequacies in conceptualization regularly translate into questionable empirical analysis. These categories do not function as emancipatory and useful concepts for critical practice because the needs of women are not served by drawing "the basic battle line between system and lifeworld institutions" (Fraser 1989, p. 137) . Fraser insists that "there is a more basic battle line between the forms of male dominance linking 'system' to 'lifeworld ' and us" (ibid.) . Therefore Habermas's account does not meet the distinct needs of women under modern conditions, and should be rejected from any reasonable feminist perspective.
In particular, Habermas's call for the "de-colonization" of the lifeworld is not helpful or practical advice for those engaged in social struggles. Colonization refers to the intrusion of mechanisms belonging to the maintenance of social systems into the sphere of the life-world managed by humans, and Fraser regards this narrative as "too negative and onesided to account for the identity shifts manifested in social movements" (1989, p. 134) . Furthermore, it is uncharitable to view feminism as a monolithic expression of biologistic attachment to the female body. This underestimates the diversity and the pragmatic, experimental stance of feminists who resist both the systematic influence of capitalism and the cultural manifestations that reinforce this hegemony. The ability to adapt and counter the constantly evolving influences of economy and state on women's lives (and men's lives) requires an appreciation of the multidirectionality of adept social struggle.
Benhabib defends the thesis that "in his moral theory Habermas inherits a number of dubious distinctions from the liberal social-contract tradition that are at odds with the more critical and political intentions of his theory of late-capitalist societies" (Benhabib 1992, pp. 88-89) . The contrasts between "public issues of justice" and "private conceptions of the good life," or "public interests" versus "private needs" are the most worrisome. If we suppose that consistent commitment to discourse ethics is legitimate, then this undermines the standard liberal contrast between a public and private sphere. For if the agents can question any relevant matter, then the distinction between justice and the good life, or norm justification and need interpretation, is itself "internal, and not external, to the process of discursive will formation" (ibid., p. 89). Therefore, in order to be consistent, Habermas must drop such unnecessary distinctions as they continue to distort his account of appropriate political action.
The distinction between public and private is particularly important because it establishes what is and what is not subject to social criticism. Inhibitions on the criticism of our intimate lives have the ideological function of blocking discussion concerning whether or not women are sexually exploited. According to Benhabib, Habermas's main proposal has the potential to overcome traditional norms concerned with the "gender division of labour" because it anticipates the democratic negotiation of all social norms (ibid., p. 93). Recall that Habermas claims that bringing hitherto private issues into the public sphere is an interesting development, yet he dissents from the feminist strategy. If Benhabib's view that the feminist account is a radicalization of the potential of his discourse ethics is right, then his principle that legitimate interpretation of needs should be generalizable to all persons is unreasonable because that principle itself is also subject to actual processes of discursive will formation.
Regarding what needs to be discussed and what should be left alone as an open question is a distinct, or characteristic, feminist position. Unlike classical liberalism, which appeals to a framework in which there is a legitimate difference between self-regarding and other-regarding behaviour that all intuitively grasp, the feminist stance is that such intuitions must be scrutinized with a view to their consequences in improving women's lives.
The second feminist argument is that Habermas's account is genderblind, and that this impoverishes his ability to correct for androcentrism. Primarily, feminism involves raising gender awareness through special attention to problems that follow from being female rather than male in societies that historically have been male-dominated. For example, Susan Okin argues against what she calls "false gender neutrality," which is the use of gender-neutral language to disguise the fact that we continue to live in a deeply gender-structured society. There are usually some relevant differences between the separate standpoints of men and women that theorists should recognize. For example, discussion of pregnancy and abortion should recognize the different relationships between fetuses and their male and female parents if it is to be relevant to our existing society (Okin 1989, pp. 10-13, 106-7) .
According to Fraser, many of the weaknesses of Habermas's account "stem from his failure to thematize the gender subtext of the relations and arrangements he describes" (Fraser 1989, p. 124 ). Her thesis is that "a critical social theory of capitalist societies needs gender-sensitive categories" (ibid., p. 128). By a "subtext," Fraser refers to the systematic, but usually uninterpreted, connection between social roles and gender. Habermas fails to emphasize the gender subtext underlying female roles such as child rearer, consumer and vulnerable person and male roles such as worker, citizen, soldier, protector and speaker. As a consequence, Habermas fails to connect the capitalist workplace with the male-headed family, or the public speaker with the capacity of men to protect their women (ibid., p. 127). The point is not that being a consumer is necessarily connected with being female. It is rather that, under existing social conditions, the consumer role is primarily associated with women, and that this is a function of an objectionable history of subordinating women's activities to wage-earning partners.
Furthermore, Habermas is not forced to use concepts of generalizable interests that ignore or marginalize this subtext of interests that belong to the class of women as a whole. Generalizable interests need not always refer to humanity as a whole, as it is equally legitimate to produce reasons based on the generalizable interests of particular classes of agents such as women. The contrast between particular and universal is often overdrawn, and there is a vast intermediate zone of group interests. Habermas's discourse ethics is built ambiguously upon what he calls "generalizable interests." His reaction to separatist feminism is much more revealing, as it posits a forced choice between purely selfish interests and ideally constructed interests of all concerned that does little to sort out existing political conflicts among groups.
The complaint about gender-blindness is an accusation that one underestimates the importance of understanding the aspects of social oppression that are connected to one gender rather than another. This insensitivity cannot be rectified by extending the analysis Habermas has constructed to these new issues. As Young argues with regard to Milton Fisk's theory of justice, this would assume that gender relations are reducible to a more fundamental kind of human relation, such as the relation between ruling class and the oppressed. But it is more plausible to conceive social struggle through distinct crises related to irreducible dimensions of human life like gender, race, nationality and income (Young 1992, pp. 68-69) .
Young contends that Habermas's discourse ethics is not sufficient for oppressed groups such as women because it contains no mechanisms for special representation. A model for communication that is not merely hypothetical must recognize the actual conditions required for appropriate outcomes from decision-making processes, given human beings as we know them. It "should promote conditions for the expression of the concrete needs of all individuals in their particularity" (1990b, p. 125) . Since these needs are constituted in part through group affinity and affiliation, the full expression of their interests under oppressive conditions "requires that they have a specific voice in deliberation" (ibid.). Habermas unreasonably presupposes a new type of human being in order to make his scheme plausible, and Young recognizes this strategy as an attempt to reduce universality to abstract generality rather than grasping the conditions that will actually achieve full participation. "The goal is not to give special compensation to the deviant until they achieve normality, but rather to denormalize the way institutions formulate their rules by revealing the plural circumstances and needs that exist, or ought to exist, within them" (ibid., p. 134). Thus, the problem with Habermas's proposed framework is that it is most h'keJy not to win the full participation of women and others in decision-making.
The third feminist criticism is that Habermas insists on a formal requirement of universality in moral standards, but there is an alternative conception of universality that is both less problematic and more useful for emancipatory politics. Benhabib distinguishes "substitutionalist" universalism from "interactive universalism." Substitutionalist universalism "surreptitiously [identifies] the experiences of a specific group of subjects as the paradigmatic case of the human as such" (Benhabib 1987, p. 81) . On the other hand, interactive universalism (1) recognizes the plurality of ways of being human without endorsing all of them; and (2) regards difference as the point of departure for reflection and action, yet also holds that there are rational standards for argument and that some procedure of universalizability is a necessary condition for this moral standpoint (1987, p. 81 ). Benhabib's complaint is that Habermas's insistence on a universality that denies the place for a distinct feminist perspective is misguided and unnecessary. In my view, however, this non-traditional sense of universality must be developed further in order to become compelling.
Benhabib goes on to contrast the "standpoint of the generalized other" in which our "relation to the other is governed by the norms of formal equality and reciprocity" with the "standpoint of the concrete other" which appeals to norms of "equity and complementary reciprocity" (1987, p. 87) . She contends that the generalized other is a necessary but not suf-ficient condition for defining the moral point of view appropriate to our times. We must also include the concrete standpoint. "Substitutionalist universalism dismisses the concrete other, while interactive universalism acknowledges that every generalized other is also a concrete other" (1987, p. 92) . According to Benhabib's coherence account, then, substitutionalist universalism never was appropriate because it oversimplified the issues involved in moral judgment.
However, this conclusion raises some doubts about Benhabib's choice of terminology. The contrasts between formal equality and equity, or reciprocity and complementary reciprocity, are too underdeveloped to serve as criteria for distinguishing unwarranted from warranted critique. In what sense are these standpoints competing versions of universalism? Substitutionalist universalism, by definition, projects the identity of one group over all and thus is rather ethnocentric. So it is a particularism disguised as a universalism and therefore should not be regarded as a universalism at all. On the other hand, interactive universalism abstracts from what constitutes our commonality in order to comprehend concrete, individual beings with specific needs. It is never clear how any universalistic dimension follows from this concrete starting point. Thus the dialectic between an older model of universalism and a new, improved model founders on the problem of defining the appropriate constituents of justificatory procedures in an inclusive, coherentist account.
I think that Fraser constructs a way around this dilemma. She argues that Benhabib tends to focus too much on individuality, or "the specificity of a unique individual, with a unique affective-emotional constitution and life history," rather than on "the collective dimension of the relational concept of identity" (Fraser 1986, pp. 427-28) . Fraser urges that we integrate particularistic and universalistic considerations in an "ethic of solidarity," and argues that this is "more appropriate than an ethic of care for a feminist ethic, if we think of a feminist ethic as the ethic of a social and political movement" (ibid., pp. 428-29). Such integration avoids the extremes of too much emphasis on "unique individuality" or on "universal humanity," and it is politically pragmatic to centre criticism in "the intermediate zone of group identity" (ibid., p. 428).
Fraser contributes three further points that are relevant to this third criticism. First, in practice, groups have found it necessary to withdraw and define themselves in separatist terms. Though cultural separatism is not viable as a long-term strategy, it is necessary in the short term for many women's survival. Fraser observes that "separatist communities have, in fact, been the source of numerous reinterpretations of women's experience that have proved politically fruitful in contestation over the means of interpretation and communication" (1989, p. 136) . Thus Habermas's resistance to the means used by feminists should be rejected. As a matter of experience, they have found it useful to separate themselves in order to organize themselves properly, and Habermas's detached stance does not recognize the trial and error supporting this practice.
For example, consider the use of "safe spaces." Often, safe spaces are rooms or buildings from which men are excluded temporarily so that women can gather and communicate. The name "safe space" may seem offensive to some persons, for it implies that all men are dangerous and only when all men are excluded can women be truly safe. It is meant to be politically provoking, and this should not overshadow the point that these experimental gatherings can be good for the persons involved. Are they necessarily obnoxious to all those excluded? This temporary discrimination is also an occasion for those outside to think about the whole situation, and it provides unique opportunities to reexamine one's embodiment as a male rather than as a female. What would it be like, men can ask, to be among women only? What secrets do they tell each other, and could we ever understand? But safe spaces are not necessarily without regrettable consequences. For example, what if women's use of separate publics leads to a drying up of women's participation in the general public, in effect, leaving many men without the benefit of women's intellectual work?
Second, this strategy promotes participation of marginal groups by reinforcing their differences and helping to widen the scope of argument. Fraser contends that in divided societies, a strategy that encourages contestation among competing groups is likely to encourage equal participation more than a strategy involving a single, comprehensive public sphere. In the latter case, agents of oppressed groups would have "no arenas for deliberation among themselves about their needs, objectives, and strategies" that are not "under the supervision of dominant groups" (1992, pp. 122-23) . In these "parallel discursive arenas," agents of "subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs" (ibid., p. 123). Though Habermas recognizes these groups as parts of a more "comprehensive public sphere" (Habermas 1987, p. 360) , Fraser argues that their independent standing as alternatives is more significant.
Third, there is a sense in which the claim that universal values are preferable to particularistic values is irrelevant. It is not true that the new social identities created by the feminist movement can be dismissed as "particularistic lapses from universalism" because "at the level of substantive content, as opposed to dialogical form, the contrast between universalism and particularism is out of place" (Fraser 1989, p. 136) . The expression of non-traditional identities are meant only to displace the traditional stereotypes, and this emancipation is not rightly judged in uni-versalistic terms because it is a response to a historically specific set of conditions. Fraser conceives the theoretical support for feminist criticism in a way that contradicts Habermas's model of appropriate criticism. Different interests of women are an acceptable reason for selecting standards for criticizing institutions, according to Fraser. The reason that these different interests are legitimate bases for objections is not because they are universalizable in Habermas's sense, but because social struggle is about getting all kinds of persons to participate and empowering them according to their own challenges in life.
Young adds to this third criticism by making three complementary points supporting the rejection of traditional universalism in moral argument. First, Habermas's notion of an ideal speech situation is not sufficient as a standard of criticism because it is empty. It is a formal and abstract vision of "pure democracy and social reciprocity," and in order to use it for developing standards of justice appropriate for assessing existing institutions, "we must introduce material premises derived from actual social circumstances" (Young 1981, p. 295 ). This does not dismiss universalistic considerations from all political argument; the point is rather that by themselves such considerations are insufficient.
Second, there is a long history of abuse of the ideal of universal rationality that needs to be repudiated. Young claims that "the ideal of normative reason as standing at a point transcending all perspectives is both illusory and oppressive" (1987, p. 60) . Her main worry is that Habermas's approach devalues the contribution of the emotions in moral judgment. Habermas pursues a "transcendental argument" when he reconstructs the presuppositions of discourse and must abstract from individual motives and desires. This type of argument reproduces the hierarchy between reason and desire that characterizes the Kantian tradition. "A more thoroughly pragmatic interpretation of dialogic reason would not have to suppose that participants must abstract from all motives in aiming to reach agreement" (ibid., p. 69). It is in this sense that Habermas falls back into a traditional conception of universality. This tradition denies emotions and embodiment because reason is supposed to be impersonal and detached from all influences of the body. The problem is that this denial of embodiment regularly translates into a denial of the relevance of the female body to social issues.
Third, Young agrees with Fraser's point concerning the need for counter-publics. She contrasts Habermas's commitment to a "homogeneous public" with her alternative ideal of a "heterogeneous public" in which one expects to encounter others whose perspectives, loyalties and experiences are different (Young 1990a, p. 119 ). Young does ultimately appeal to a principle of non-exclusion, but this appeal is not to a traditional sense of universalizability. It does not involve denying emotions because it appeals to minimal "universal values" that counteract the possible harms of oppression and domination but otherwise leave individuals free to pursue self-development (ibid., pp. 250-51).
Thus, the strategy of these feminists is to dispute Habermas's claims that the appeal to group interests is unacceptable, that the ideal conditions for democratic communities are universalizable, and that retreating to one's sisterhood is an impoverished way to emancipation. These claims are the main premises for the three arguments described at the start and, if they are implausible, then Habermas's resistance to feminism is also groundless.
Habermas's Response to His Feminist Critics
In this section, I argue that Habermas's response to his feminist critics has not been entirely satisfying. It has not been direct enough, though he does address these kinds of arguments. First, I list the points that Habermas concedes to these critics. These concessions accept the second criticism that his account is gender-blind, but he resists the first and third criticisms, which argue that his basic distinctions are inadequate and that the principle of universality must itself be questioned. This, in effect, disputes the claim concerning the distinctiveness of a feminist critique of existing societies.
In "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere," Habermas concedes the following points to his feminist critics: (1) "the growing feminist literature has sensitized our awareness to the patriarchal character of the public sphere itself" (Habermas 1992a, p. 427) ; (2) that the gains in democratic rights and the compensations of the welfare-state "proceeded without affecting the patriarchal character of society as a whole" (ibid., p. 428); and (3) that he "was too pessimistic about the resisting power and above all the critical potential of a pluralistic, internally much differentiated mass public whose cultural usages have begun to shake off the constraints of class" (ibid., p. 438).
Notice that these three points are empirical corrections of his research. The first point is that he "idealized what were presented as features of an existing liberal public sphere," but he should have paid closer attention to the empirical evidence that there were exclusionary mechanisms at work there (1992b, pp. 463, 466) . The second point concerns the consequences of democratic transformations on the actual lives of women in early liberal societies. The third point concerns the consequences of strategies of social struggle oriented to particular movements, and whether they actually work.
The first feminist criticism was that Habermas's distinctions between system and life-world and public and private do not allow for the adequate articulation of women's struggles. Habermas continues to use both of these distinctions and does not rebut the objections at all. But he uses public and private in a descriptive rather than normative sense, that is, "those private people who in the associations of the bourgeois public sphere had come together to form the public of citizens " (1992a, p. 434) . This care has no parallel with regard to system and life-world, however. He does not back off from the battle line of system and life-world, and explains that it constitutes an improvement on his earlier conception of society as a whole democratic sphere (ibid., pp. 443-44). Thus, it seems that his awareness of the self-transformation in his own discourse (that his later work improves upon his earlier blindness) forms an obstacle to taking complaints about his improved framework. He thinks that a contrast between system and life-world accommodates feminism by naming it as one of the many social movements that counteract the colonization of the life-world.
Why should feminists not be satisfied with being just another social movement? For one thing, this analysis denies the distinctiveness of feminist perspectives and suggests that, because social movements are equivalent, a general solution for all must be accepted by each movement. Quite apart from this trivialization, Habermas is rather self-conscious about what he should now say to feminists. He concedes that "the exclusion of women from this world dominated by men now looks different than it appeared" when he wrote The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 1962 Sphere in (1992a ). Yet his own work on this topic remains abstract and he hesitates to concede that women should represent their own interests exclusively because white male Europeans have failed them. He speaks generally or vaguely about voluntary associations or spontaneous forces, and this contrasts with direct, political demand for separatism characteristic of Andrea Dworkin, for example.
Perhaps it is also questionable whether Habermas's concession concerning his gender-blindness goes far enough. Part of the second feminist criticism is that existing traditions result in conditions under which many men achieve professional articulateness and competent authoritativeness that gives them a distinct advantage in public speaking (Young 1990b, p. 130) . Habermas agrees that we must be very careful that the social conditions affecting policy-making debates allow for free and equal participation of all concerned. Yet, in his account, these are understood as "procedural conditions" or "normative considerations" rather than practical or gender-relative strategies. He refers to the "intrinsic" condition of "the presumption of impartiality and the expectation that the participants question and transcend whatever their initial preferences may have been " (1992a, p. 449 ). Yet he never refers specifically to features that feminists contend are required to make women feel freer to debate in historically male-dominated societies. He thus neglects to take the need for special rights for women seriously. It is as if he does not realize the specific inhibitions facing women in public arguments, or perhaps does not want to appear patronizing.
But Habermas could reply that his model accommodates this complaint in the following way. If there is a policy debate over abortion, and women are involved, then feminists have the veto power to overcome any decision banning all abortions, or any unreasonable restrictions that they think are not in women's interests. Yet, if this is the case, it is not clear why his model does not invite endless stalemates. For groups like the religious right will also have veto power over pro-feminist proposals. The power to disagree is, in effect, only the power to prolong the debate, and it is likely that those who have the most resources and stamina will eventually bully the others into submission. Saying that any veto must also be reasonable only begs the question, for if all must agree whether a point is reasonable, then the veto power is only located at a higher level. And if Habermas supposes that we must all leave behind these affiliations before we start any debates, then he will not satisfy committed feminists and he will undermine his own intention to provide a realistic alternative to Rawls's veil of ignorance.
In discussion, Fraser asks Habermas to be more specific about "the social and economic conditions for effective participation in a nonexclusionary and genuinely democratic public sphere," and proposes that "the end of class structure" and "gender inequality" must be conditions (Habermas 1992b, pp. 468-69) . But Habermas's answer is indirect and disappointing. He ducks the gender issue and argues that capitalism must be reformed through various public pressures (but no revolution). He adds that critics should "try to give a reasonable economic analysis" of the changes that they are proposing (ibid., p. 470). I find this behaviour difficult to explain, but it is likely that Habermas agrees that ending gender inequality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an effective public sphere. He may not be familiar with the feminist literature on sexuality and reproduction, and thus not be in any position to say how the end of gender inequality is best achieved.
Furthermore, Habermas constructs an argument that attempts to deflect the third criticism aimed at the normative assumptions of his theory. Again, he describes the feminist struggle in a way that emphasizes its similarity with other struggles: "Like the social emancipation of wage workers, it is a phenomenon of the universalization of civil rights" (1992a, p. 428). He agrees with Carole Pateman that there is a contrast to be made between the consequences of excluding women from political life and the consequences of excluding underprivileged men. Creating this liberal public sphere of independent individuals required subordinating child rearing, domestic support and the intimate life that made possible the leisurely activity of arguing about public issues. Thus "the exclusion of women has been constitutive for the political public sphere not merely in that the latter has been dominated by men as a matter of contingency but also in that its structure and relation to the private sphere has been determined in a gender-specific fashion" (ibid.).
Yet Habermas goes on to argue that feminist criticism "does not dismiss rights to unrestricted inclusion and equality, which are an integral part of the liberal public sphere's self-interpretation, but rather appeals to them" (ibid., p. 429). Even though it is true that women's experiences with this liberal process of public argument are unique, the legitimacy of any complaints is based on a universal principle of including everyone in the argument. Affirming this principle is not a matter of denying the liberal ideal, but rather a matter of exposing the hypocrisy of existing liberals with regard to their professed ideals. Thus, Habermas reaffirms his universalism:
Bourgeois publicness ... is articulated in discourses that provided areas of common ground not only for the labor movement but also for the excluded other, that is, the feminist movement. Contact with these movements in turn transformed these discourses and the structures of the public sphere itself from within. From the very beginning, the universalistic discourses of the bourgeois public sphere were based on self-referential premises; they did not remain unaffected by a criticism from within because they differ from Foucaultian discourses by virtue of their potential for self-transformation (ibid., p. 429).
But Habermas refuses to recognize the distinct contribution of women as women to the transformation of the liberal public sphere. They are depersonalized, and it becomes a matter of an abstraction, the liberal public sphere, transforming itself from within.
But perhaps this objection is too strong. This recognition is not incompatible with Habermas's arguments but rather a matter of underemphasis. Habermas does not discuss sexual politics or family life in a sustained manner, and when he does he argues only at the most abstract level. His point is about the legitimacy of reasons in general, and that feminist critics' arguments are not legitimate merely because they are women speaking for women first, but because they appeal to kinds of reasons that all should agree are correct. Habermas does not need to deny the contributions that feminists have made in shifting the focus onto sexual relationships and the gender division of labour. He only denies that they have invented a new kind of legitimacy in appealing to their particular experiences of oppression, for this would imply that his unified theory of reason and legitimacy papers over differences that reflect the instability of the process of argument itself.
He assimilates the feminist strategy of asserting a distinct standpoint for women to Foucault's picture of social struggle. The key feature of Foucauldian discourses is that they collapse the distinction between force and persuasion, or rationality and irrationality, and regard argument as a power struggle rather than as an alternative to the self-assertion and counter-assertion of power. Habermas thinks that his proposed model for political argument is self-corrective because it can recognize any legitimate claims that may have been excluded by opening up political decision-making to all concerned. Thus it is a mistake to collapse the distinction between sound arguments and strategic arguments, and because feminism undervalues this distinction, it strays from the path of legitimate criticism.
Feminists can reply, however, that Habermas's distinction between Foucauldian discourses and non-Foucauldian discourses is not worked out sufficiently. According to Habermas, non-Foucauldian discourses (1) have a potential for self-transformation that involves regulative ideals contrasting with a current reality (1992a, p. 429), and (2) are "self-corrective in terms of being sensitive to a critique of systematic exclusionary mechanisms built into them " (1992b, p. 478) . By contrast, Foucauldian discourses have no potential for self-transformation and those "who participate in the discourse do not share a common language with the protesting ones " (1992a, p. 429) . It is likely that Habermas has erected a straw monster here. For the required common language (say, French) is easily satisfied even if there is no binding agreement on a final vocabulary for justification. And it is obscure why so-called Foucauldian discourses have no potential for self-transformation when Foucault's own career is a long series of transformations of his vocabulary in order to reach out to excluded groups.
According to Habermas, the feminist rejections of universality are selfrefuting because they tacitly rely on the concept of a liberal public sphere in objecting to the existing public sphere. All attempts to create a public sphere for political communication have excluded some type of persons. Nevertheless, there is no alternative to settling controversies. The ideal of a public sphere attempts to exclude violence, even if it ends up reproducing "some sort of violence internally again but in a criticizable fashion " (1992b, p. 479) . It is possible, he concludes, that this lesser violence may be the best we can achieve in political relationships.
Habermas rejects the formation of separate women's spheres of discourse in principle because his view is that discourse "includes all subjects without exception who have the capacity to take part in argumentation" and that "all participants" should have the "equal opportunity to contribute to the argumentation and to put forth their own arguments" (1990, p. 89) . This ideal of a virtually unrestricted communicative community does not permit separatist feminists to exclude men from their meetings and movement for any reason.
Of course, Habermas need not take such a strong view. For he could allow that separatist discourse has to be incorporated into a larger discourse that is not restricted to women, and it is at this later point that the requirement for open participation could be satisfied. The goal of letting women organize themselves without the supervision of men would thus require a temporary suspension of the ethical requirement that all who want to participate and who are affected by the outcome have their say.
This objection points to the conflict between the uncompromising, Kantian aspects of Habermas's position and his support for informal associations of agents (connected to various interests and movements) who operate a communicative network outside of the official state apparatus. He describes the need for an "interplay between a constitutionally instituted formation of the political will and the spontaneous flow of communication unsubverted by power, within a public sphere that is not geared toward decision making but toward discovery and problem resolution" (1992a, p. 451). It remains unclear how the relationships between formal procedure and informal practices is worked out in detail, or why the informal is subordinated to the formal. There is an unresolved tension between the formal and spontaneous dimensions of criticism that is reproduced in Habermas's relationship with feminists.
His reply to the separatists is that the regulative ideal of a non-violent, rational public sphere remains valid despite its flaws. It grounds all complaints about exclusion because such complaints presuppose the ideal of comprehensive political decision-making in principle. Violence must be excluded in order to create an appropriate situation for argument, but the feminist proposal for exclusions that separate and organize women's interests apart from the community cannot be defended as necessary for the rationality of the argument situation. But this insists that women's interests be only spontaneous contributions to a general argument concerning needs, and rejects the institutionalization of women's interpretation of need in a formally separate critical standpoint. Feminist critics seek a more organized front for women's needs, and Habermas unreasonably denies their understanding of what is effective under contemporary conditions.
Thomas McCarthy's Objections to Habermas
The inadequacy of Habermas's response to feminist criticisms is further reinforced by two objections made by his leading American interpreter, Thomas McCarthy. His position is that Habermas does not adequately follow through on his intention to detranscendentalize justification in political argument. McCarthy emphasizes the function of universalistic constraints within a critical practice that includes particularistic considerations as well (1991, p. 2) . The pragmatic presuppositions of communi-cation are regulative ideals for criticism, but they are neither the foundation of all subsequent criticism nor the only regulative ideals that are reasonable under modern conditions. This requires a substantial revision of Habermas's hierarchical practice of giving more weight to universalizable reasons than reasons rooted in particular forms of life.
First, McCarthy notes the tension between Habermas's philosophical restraint towards particular political processes and his commitment to unanimous rational consensus: "what he has to say about needs, interests, and values pulls against what he says about rational consensus, and it does so in ways that suggest a more flexible and politically serviceable conception of rationally motivated agreement" (McCarthy 1991, p. 182) . If Habermas welcomes "the heightened pluralism of forms of life and individualism of personality structures characteristic of modern cultures," and this leads to different value orientations, then he cannot also require that all interests be generalizable or that all valid norms be universalizable (ibid., p. 194). For if "judgments of the relative cogency of reasons that cite needs" vary according to evaluative perspective, and if there is no common measure to sort out all these different evaluative languages, then Habermas oversimplifies the relationship between better or worse reasons in his model of political argument (ibid.). Reasons do not have a prefixed value. They may float or sink, depending on their relevance, soundness and effectiveness in particular conditions of argument. Good reasons are not a natural kind, and they do not necessarily express generalizable interests in the context of social criticism.
Second, Habermas's contrast between a "strategically motivated compromise of interest and an argumentatively achieved consensus on validity" underestimates the possibilities of action. "If the ultimate moralpolitical significance of agreement based on reasons is to provide an alternative to open or latent coercion as a means of social coordination, there is room for more than these varieties" (ibid., p. 196) . For example, it is reasonable to include "elements of conciliation, compromise, consent, accommodation and the like" because these elements can "give sense to participants' argumentative practices" (ibid., p. 197) . McCarthy emphasizes that Habermas's ideals are only part of the set of legitimate, regulative ideals and must be conceived in equilibrium with less rationalistic considerations: "The only supposition that seems necessary for the genuine give and take of rational discourse is that the force of the better argument can contribute to the final shape of whatever type of agreement is reached" (ibid.). Thus, Habermas does not adequately recognize an important difference between a constraint understood as a contributing consideration and a constraint understood as a necessary and sufficient condition.
McCarthy concludes that Habermas's model for argument is too strong, for there are "alternatives to coercion not captured by his notions of negotiated compromise and rational consensus" (ibid., p. 198) . For example, agents may agree that women who kill their abusers may be charged with manslaughter rather than murder in the hope that they will eventually achieve the social position required to change the charge from manslaughter to self-defence. Habermas never adequately recognizes this strategic dimension of political movements. Regarding unanimity as one desideratum among others leaves room for the strategy of starting from distinct standpoints within political argument. It is not self-defeating to follow the feminists here but realistic because there are non-generalizable, legitimate interests in complex societies such as ours. McCarthy recognizes the capacity of different social movements to make original contributions to our public sphere.
Conclusion
This debate brings many other questions into view. I have neglected to discuss which parts of Habermas might be useful for feminists. What role should recognition of differences play in fair political argument? For instance, is race or gender a condition for formulating a sound and effective argument as a representative connected to a social movement? My view is that there is a creative stage in which feminists separate and define themselves by organizing new forms of argument (this can be an ongoing affair). But, at later stages or through the communication of these critiques, others can assume a feminist stance as well. Therefore being different is a condition for creating these alternative reasoning strategies but not for putting them to good use afterward. Though Habermas points out that we should reject a politically naive account of just recognizing difference and then living happily ever after (1992b, p. 467) , it is equally important to avoid uncompelling accounts of reason and generalizable interests.
I do not think that it is necessary to claim that feminists have invented a new species of legitimacy in political argument as opposed to rehabilitating a neglected practice. This appeal to difference or special connection is better understood in a symbiotic relationship with the tendency to overemphasize the detached standpoint of the Supercritic who has no gender, class, race or natural limitations (see Couture 1992, pp. 71-75) . It does constitute a reminder for Habermas's model, and it is fair to say that feminists have forced us to rethink radically Habermas's more abstract requirements.
